You must supply a hostname which is known to this webserver.
hostname == sitename == the bit between http:// and the next /
To defend against a very nasty type of targetted attack. Suppose that there exists someone trying to probe their way into our system? Even if not particularly likely for some of us, it's good practice to assume that there might be someone and to get into the habit of defending against it.
Key points for this are:
The attacker uses frames. The top frame is loaded from www.evil.example.net. One of the child frames is loaded from victim.evil.example.net. For some browsers, the parent frame will be able to use JavaScript to control the child frame, because both are in the same domain, right? Well, so what? The attacker controls DNS for evil.example.net, so they can make “victim” point at any IP address they want. Including one of our IP addresses, even if an address is in RFC 1918 space.
Net result: if the server responds with content when given unknown hostnames then an attacker can do anything to any web-pages with JavaScript; all they need is web-hosting and DNS control, and for someone to be nudged into visiting their site with a frames-capable brower which has JavaScript enabled (which is every major browser and most of the minor ones too).
In theory, these days browsers have learnt to protect against this with careful application of same-origin policies. In practice, there is no end in sight to the stream of browser security holes, for every web-browser implementing a scripting engine, which allow these browser-side cross-site scripting (XSS) bugs. So fairly often and without prior warning, the “some” browsers mentioned before suddenly become “many” or even “most”.
Because the entire attack can be neutralised on the webservers which hold the content to be protected, without having to worry about the patch status of every client browser or the presence of bugs not publicly disclosed, and because the fix is normally easy and lightweight, all webservers should ideally be careful to only respond to hostnames which they explicitly know about. This ideal might not always be practicable, but for typical webservers it is.
Latest example: Same-origin protection doesn't help when the same hostname is being requested. If the hostname is served with short TTL and uses resources on the same hostname, a malicious DNS server can serve RFC 1918 address-space results for the second query. This is a “DNS rebinding” attack. You can try to protect against it by:
Which real site?
Why don't you try a search engine to find the content that you were after? And no, there are no links to search engines on this page, to keep bad hostnames or raw IP addresses from appearing in Referer: logs and discovering that some search engines are using these sites as input for their web-crawl systems. That might lead to legitimate traffic to this page, but we like to be able to review the webserver logs and determine if we've misconfigured something or if someone's doing something they shouldn't. In the former case, we have an extra type of feedback to correct problems, which is always good. In the latter case we can decide whether or not to report suspicious activity. We're not always nice people.